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                                                                         Abstract
Using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, this paper shows that interest rates, particularly those of
long-term government bonds, decrease when countries’ ﬁscal position improves and increase around periods
of budget deteriorations. Stock market prices surge around times of substantial ﬁscal tightening and plunge
in periods of very loose ﬁscal policy. In addition, the paper shows that results depend on countries’ initial
ﬁscal conditions and on the type of ﬁscal consolidations: ﬁscal adjustments that occur in country-years with
high levels of government deﬁcit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a
permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates
and increases in stock market prices.
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* ManuscriptAbstract
Using a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2002, this paper shows that interest rates, particularly those of
long-term government bonds, decrease when countries’ ﬁscal position improves and increase around periods
of budget deteriorations. Stock market prices surge around times of substantial ﬁscal tightening and plunge
in periods of very loose ﬁscal policy. In addition, the paper shows that results depend on countries’ initial
ﬁscal conditions and on the type of ﬁscal consolidations: ﬁscal adjustments that occur in country-years with
high levels of government deﬁcit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a
permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates
and increases in stock market prices.1 Introduction
In the last forty years, periods of largeﬁscal expansions alternated with years of sharp ﬁscal contractions in all
OECD countries. These episodes have been associated with a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and have
attracted the interest of macroeconomists since the early nineties. Several papers have studied the response
of private consumption, private investment and GDP growth to substantial changes in the government budget
while less is known about the reaction of ﬁnancial markets around episodes of large ﬁscal contractions and
expansions.1 Moreover, theory and empirical evidence have not yet delivered clear-cut predictions on the
impact of ﬁscal policy shocks on interest rates and stock market prices.2
These considerations, together with the importance of the topic for European and US policymakers, call
for additional work on the link betweenﬁscal policy and ﬁnancial variables and motivate the present paper. In
particular, the goal of this paper is to investigate empirically the behavior of government and corporate bonds
interest rates, of the LIBOR, and of stock market prices in times of large changes in the ﬁscal stance. The
paper identiﬁes periods of large ﬁscal contractions and expansions in a panel of OECD countries from 1960
to 2002 and it focuses on changes in interest rates and stock market prices from before to after the periods
of large changes in ﬁscal policy.3 By following this empirical approach, the paper answers the following
1See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna (2004a), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990),
Giavazzi, JappelliandPagano(2000), andMcDermotandWescott(1996)forcontributionsonlargeﬁscalcontractionsandexpansions
and the macroeconomy. See Balduzzi, Corsetti, and Foresi (1997)for a model on the slope of the yield-curve around periods of large
ﬁscal contractions.
2An incomplete list of papers on ﬁscal policy and interest rates includes Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004), Barro (1987), Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1990), Blanchard and Summers (1984), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Engen and Hubbard (2004), Evans
(1985) and (1987), Feldstein (1986), Hoelscher (1986), Laubach (2003), Miller and Russek (1991) and (1996), Orr et al. (1995),
Paesani and Strauch (2006), Perotti (2002), Plosser (1987), Reinhart and Sack (2000), and Tavares and Valkanov (2003). See, also,
Bernoth et al. (2004), and Codogno et al. (2003) for contributions on the determinants of yield differentials in EU countries, and
Barth et al. (1991) and Gale and Orszag (2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
3The empirical approach is similar to the one used by Chari and Henry (2002) and by Henry (2000) and (2002) to study the effect
1questions: (i) do changes in the budget deﬁcit affect ﬁnancial markets? (ii) do countries’ initial levels of
government deﬁcit and public debt matter for the reaction of ﬁnancial markets to ﬁscal shocks? (iii) does the
composition of the government budget affectﬁnancial variables? (iv) what role do macroeconomic conditions
and other economic policies play? (v) do ﬁnancial markets react in anticipation of more/less favorable ﬁscal
conditions in the future?
Results suggest that sharp changes in the stance of ﬁscal policy have the largest and most signiﬁcant im-
pact on long-term interest rates of government bonds. Interest rates of 10-year government bonds decrease, on
average, by 124 basis points around episodes of ﬁscal consolidations and increase by 162 basis points during
periods of loose ﬁscal policy. Fiscal consolidations and expansions also affect interest rates of 3-months Trea-
sury bills and interest rates measuring borrowing costs for consumers and ﬁrms, but results are less robust to
speciﬁcations’ changes. Stock market prices increase when countries’ ﬁscal position improves and decrease
during periods of budget deteriorations. Finally, there is evidence that the effects of ﬁscal consolidations
depend also on countries’ initial ﬁscal position and on the nature of ﬁscal contractions. Fiscal adjustments
that occur in country-years with high levels of government deﬁcit, that are implemented by cutting govern-
ment spending and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government debt are associated with
larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock market prices. Instead, around periods of ﬁscal ex-
pansions the interest rates of 10-year government bonds and of corporate bonds increase and stock market
prices decrease regardless of countries’ initial ﬁscal conditions.
The contribution of this paper to the existingliterature goes beyond documenting the behavior ofﬁnancial
markets around episodes of large changes in theﬁscal stance. The paper also provides additional evidence on
the impact of ﬁscal policy shocks on ﬁnancial variables by focusing not only on interest rates of governments’
bonds (as most of the contributions in the literature do), but also on interest rates charged to consumers and
ﬁrms and on stock market prices. Finally, this paper adds to the literature that investigates why some ﬁscal
of ﬁnancial liberalization and disinﬂation programs on stock markets.
2consolidations (expansions) have been associated with economic booms (recessions) even in the very short-
run while others have not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and describes the methodol-
ogy used to identify episodes of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions. Section 3 investigates the relation
between large ﬁscal contractions and expansions, interest rates and stock market prices, discusses the results
and relates them to the implications of relevant theory. Section 4 extends the analysis of the benchmark mod-
els to account for countries’ initial ﬁscal conditions, characteristics of ﬁscal consolidations and expansions,
macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and future ﬁscal policy conditions. The last section
concludes.
2 Data, methodological issues and descriptive ﬁndings
2.1 Data
The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The
countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. All ﬁscal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 73, June 2003. Data on
ﬁnancial variables are from various sources. Interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills, of 10-year government
bonds and of corporate bonds and data on LIBOR are from Global Financial Data. Data on the discount rate
are from the International Financial Statistics database, while stock market data are from Morgan Stanley.
Finally, Milesi-Ferretti provided data on indicators of international integration of capital markets, while data
on ﬁnancial development are from the World Bank database on Financial Development and Structure.4
4The database is available on line at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/ﬁnstructure/database.htm.
32.2 Methodological issues
This section addresses the following issues: the use of yearly data rather than of high frequency data; the
choice of studying the behavior of ﬁnancial variables around episodes of sharp changes in the ﬁscal stance
rather than at the time of the announcements of the policy changes; the strategy used to identify such episodes.
In a rational world with no information asymmetries and credibility problems, ﬁnancial markets should
react when new information is released. One should observe movements of ﬁnancial variables when gov-
ernments announce ﬁscal stabilizations or ﬁscal expansions, not when they implement the policy changes if
the latter had been expected. Ideally, one would like to have information on the exact announcement date
and study the reaction of ﬁnancial variables using high frequency data as, for example, Afonso and Strauch
(2004) and Knot and de Haan (1999) do. But information on announcements of sharp ﬁscal policy changes
are not easy to gather for a panel of sixteen countries over a period of forty years. Moreover, reliable data on
ﬁscal variables are available only at a yearly frequency for such a large panel. For these reasons, this paper
follows an alternative approach: it investigates the response of ﬁnancial variables to the occurrence of ﬁscal
contractions and ﬁscal expansions with yearly data, but it also includes in the sample observations from few
years before to few years after the occurrence of the large decrease/increase in the government budget.
The main advantage of this approach is its feasibility. Moreover, by including data from few years
before to few years after the occurrence of the large ﬁscal contractions/expansions (rather than only in the
year of such policy changes) one allows for the possibility that the data detect the time of the shock and that
ﬁnancial markets anticipate the policy change and/or react to changes in the ﬁscal stance over time as more
information becomes available. The main drawback of the use of yearly data rather than high frequency data
is that the empirical analysis can potentially suffer from a measurement error problem. In fact, the connection
between sharp changes in the ﬁscal stance and ﬁnancial variables becomes weaker the further away from
the announcement or from the unexpected occurrence of ﬁscal contractions and expansions, because of the
existence of other factors in different time periods. In the attempt to show that results are not driven by
4such potential problems, this paper concentrates on a window from two years before to two years after the
occurrence of a ﬁscal contraction or expansion in the benchmark speciﬁcations.5 Section 4, then, shows that
the estimated relationships between asset prices and large changes in the ﬁscal stance are robust to several
extensions and robustness checks including controls for other policy shocks and changes in the number of
years of data used to generate the sample.
Finally, to identify episodes of ﬁscal contractions and expansions, I follow the recent literature on ﬁscal
adjustments and use the same criteria as in Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Ardagna (2004a). Speciﬁcally,
in the benchmark speciﬁcations, an episode of large ﬁscal contraction (expansion) is a period in which the
cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP or a period of two
consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1 per cent
of GDP per year, in both years.6 I use the primary deﬁcit, rather than the total deﬁcit, to avoid that episodes
selected result from the effect that changes in interest rates have on government expenditures. Moreover, I
cyclically adjust the primary deﬁcit to leave aside variations of the ﬁscal variables induced by business cycle
ﬂuctuations.7 Hence, episodes selected through this technique should not result from the automatic response
5In the case of multi-years periods of ﬁscal contractions or ﬁscal expansions, the samples include data from two years before the
ﬁrst year of the episode of a ﬁscal contraction or expansion to two years after the last year of the episode.
6The deﬁnition selects 92 periods of ﬁscal contractions and 69 years of ﬁscal expansions (see Ardagna (2004b) for a list of all the
episodes of ﬁscal contractions and expansions selected by the rule). The majority of the episodes are well known in the literature and
several alternative deﬁnitions of ﬁscal episodes select them. The inclusion of other periods in the samples, instead, is sensitive to the
rule used to identify the episodes. In section 4.6, I check that results are robust to the use of alternative deﬁnitions.
7The cyclical adjustment is based on the method proposed by Blanchard (1993) and follows the application in Alesina and Perotti
(1995). Note that there is considerable debate in the literature on which ﬁscal variable matters for interest rates (see, for example,
Engen and Hubbard (2004)). As Gali and Perotti (2003) suggest, the choice of theﬁscal policy indicator depends on the underlying
model. For example, in a standard IS-LM model, changes in the government deﬁcit determine movements of the IS curve, while the
level of the deﬁcit determines the position of the curve. General equilibrium micro-founded models, instead, emphasize the stock of
public debt. While the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal episodes relies on the change in the primary deﬁcit, I also investigate the role played by
public debt and total deﬁcit in sections 4.1 and 4.5.
5of ﬁscal variables to economic growth or monetary policy changes, but they should reﬂect discretionary policy
choices of ﬁscal authorities.
Needless to say, there can still be an endogeneity issue related to the occurrence ofﬁscal contractions and
expansions, because, in principle, discretionary policy choices ofﬁscal authorities can be affected byﬁnancial
variablesorcountries’macroeconomicconditions(seeVonHagenandStrauch(2001)andVonHagen, Hallett,
and Strauch (2002)).8 However, note that, for the purpose of this paper, the endogeneity problem due to the
response of ﬁscal authorities to interest rates is likely to bias the results downward. In fact, it is plausible
that policymakers respond to higher interest rates by tightening the government budget. Moreover, consider
also that the budget for the current year is approved during the second half of the previous year and, even
though additional measures can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective with
some delay, generally toward the end of the ﬁscal year. Hence, the selection of episodes of ﬁscal contractions
and expansions based on the rule discussed above cannot systematically result from the discretionary response
of governments to changes in interest rates or stock market indicators. In conclusion, the assumption that the
cyclically adjusted primary deﬁcit does not depend on GDP or ﬁnancial variables seems to be a reasonable
approximation to reality and, if it induces a bias in the coefﬁcients, most likely, such bias works to weaken
the results found in the paper.
2.3 Descriptive ﬁndings
Figure 1 shows the distribution of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions across the countries in the sample
and over time. All countries experience at least one year of substantial improvement and worsening of the
8Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) identify episodes of ﬁscal consolidations on the basis of changes to the total cyclically adjusted
government balance and study the effect of macroeconomic and monetary conditions on the occurrence of ﬁscal stabilizations. They
ﬁnd that economic conditions inﬂuence the probability of ﬁscal consolidations and their types but that the stance of monetary policy
does not play a relevant role. Von Hagen, Hallett, and Strauch (2002) investigate theeffect of economic conditions and of the quality
of ﬁscal consolidations on the success of such policy reforms andﬁnd evidence along the same lines.
6cyclically adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio. The highest percentage ofﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal ex-
pansions happen in Sweden, where ﬁscal policy is substantially tight and lax in 10 and 11 years respectively.
Italy and the UK are also among the countries that experience more swings in ﬁscal policy, while Japan is
in the bottom quartile of the distribution of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions. Overall, nine countries
belong to the same quartile of the distribution of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions. Only one coun-
try, Ireland, shows a substantial higher propensity to implement ﬁscal contractions than ﬁscal expansions.
During the ﬁrst ten years of the sample there is relatively little action in terms of sharp changes in the ﬁscal
stance. Episodes of ﬁscal expansions dominate the seventies. Periods of ﬁscal contractions are relatively
more frequent in the eighties and nineties. In the most recent years, the stance ofﬁscal policy has turned into
expansionary again.9
Figure 2 shows the average value of interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills, of 10-year government
bonds and of corporate bonds, and the average value of the discount rate and LIBOR across episodes ofﬁscal
contractions and ﬁscal expansions. Figure 3 focuses on the stock market. The x-axis plots time relative to
the occurrence of ﬁscal contractions and expansions. Time T indicates the time at which changes in the ﬁscal
stance occur. Average values of ﬁnancial variables are shown from time T   3 (three years before the ﬁscal
contraction/expansion period) to T   3 (three years after). Summary statistics of ﬁnancial variables are also
shown in the appendix.
The top left part of Figure 2 shows that, from T  2 onward, the pattern of the 10-year government bonds
interest rate around the time of ﬁscal contractions is opposite to the one around periods of ﬁscal expansions:
while the 10-year government bonds interest rate decreases by 111 basis points in episodes of ﬁscal contrac-
tions, it increases by 185 basis points in ﬁscal expansions. As a consequence, in T   2, the interest rate is
higher in ﬁscal expansions than in ﬁscal contractions (8.89% versus 10.55%) even if in T   2 the situation
9Note that the trends in Figure 1 reﬂect changes in the discretionary part of ﬁscal policy. In fact, the change in the primary
balance-to-GDP ratio has been cyclically adjusted.
7was reversed (10% versus 8.70%).
The 3-month Treasury bills interest rate shows a similar pattern. Even though during episodes of ﬁscal
expansions the increase in the rate is not continuous over time, from T   2 to T   2 the 3-month Treasury
bills interest rate increases by 188 basis points and it decreases by 86 basis points in ﬁscal contractions.
Next, ﬁgure 2 plots the average value of the discount rate. Interestingly, following a sharp increase from
T   3 to T   2 in ﬁscal expansions, the discount rate is almost identical in the two types of episodes from
T  2 to T  2. From T  2 to T  3, it increases by 15 basis points in ﬁscal contractions and decreases by 70
basis points in ﬁscal expansions. Overall, and in particular from T  2 to T  2, its level and dynamics show
less clear differences acrossﬁscal episodes than the 10-year government bonds and the 3-month Treasury bills
interest rates do.
The last two charts of Figure 2 plot the LIBOR and the average interest rate of corporate bonds. The LI-
BORand the corporate bondsinterest ratedecrease fromT 2 to T 2 by167and 56 basis points respectively
during episodes of ﬁscal contractions and increase by 153 and 185 basis points in ﬁscal expansions. A more
careful look at the charts also reveals that the interestrate of corporate bonds follows more closely the dynam-
ics of the 10-year government bonds interest rates, even though period by period changes are smaller. The
pattern of the LIBOR, instead, reﬂects more the one of the interest rates of 3-month Treasury bills, especially
in ﬁscal consolidations.
Let’s now turn to the stock market. Figure 3 shows the average of the MSCI share price index (expressed
in US $ and in logs) and its growth rate. While share prices sharply increase as aﬁscal adjustment approaches,
they plunge in the proximity of a ﬁscal expansion. For example, from T   2 to T   2 the log of the MSCI
share price index increases by 6.02 per cent when ﬁscal policy is tight and decreases by 6.36 per cent when it
is lax. The rate of growth of the index is always positive and higher than the one in T   2 (equal to 4.71%)
during ﬁscal contractions, but it is negative (except in T  1) and substantially lower than the 13.39% growth
rate in T   2 during ﬁscal expansions.
8In summary, a ﬁrst look at the data suggests that the cost of ﬁnancing the government debt and the
borrowing costs for consumers and ﬁrms are correlated with the stance of ﬁscal policy, and that the effects
seem to be anticipated and to persist over time. However, by simply looking at the charts, it is not possible
to rule out other interpretations. One alternative story could be that the sharp differences in the pattern of
interest rates around ﬁscal episodes simply reﬂect differences in the stance of monetary policy if the latter
is systematically lax around periods of ﬁscal adjustments and tight around episodes of ﬁscal expansions.
Looking at the patterns of the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and of the LIBOR one might be tempted
to believe that this story is plausible. However, the dynamics of the discount rate seems to discourage this
interpretation. Moreover, the evidence that the 10-year government bonds interest rate and the corporate
bonds interest rate continuously decline/increase over time (and do not reﬂect swings as the short-term rates
do) seems to suggest that large changes in ﬁscal policy can at least affect long-term interest rates. The
following sections explore more carefully the nature of such relation.
3 Econometric evidence
3.1 Basic speciﬁcations
I begin by investigating the relation between interest rates, stock market data and the stance of ﬁscal policy
by regressing the nominal and the real 10-year government bonds interest rate (INT10Y and RINT10Y,
respectively), the nominal and the real 3-month Treasury bills interest rate (INT3M and RINT3M, respec-
tively),10 the discount rate (DISCR), the LIBOR (LI BOR), the corporate bonds’ interest rate (CORP), the
10One would like to measure RINT10Y as the difference between the 10-year nominal interest rate and expectations of inﬂation
over the next ten years. Inﬂation’s forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for the panel of countries used here.
I follow Orr et al. (1995) and compute trend inﬂation using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. I apply the ﬁlter to each country’s inﬂation
rate using quarterly data (from IFS database) and a value of   equal to 1600. I, then, take the average over each year of the trend
inﬂation generated with quarterly data and calculate the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of
9log of the MSCI share price index (MSCI), and the MSCI share price index growth rate (MSCIGR) on a set
of dummy variables capturing the time distance from the episodes of ﬁscal contractions or ﬁscal expansions.
Speciﬁcally, I estimate:
Financialijt    i    1T IMEijT 1    2T IMEijT    3T IMEijT 1    4T IMEijT 2    ijt (1)
where Financial is one of the variables above, T IMET j are four dummy variables equal to 1 when j  
 1 0 1 2 respectively and zero otherwise,  i captures country ﬁxed effects, i indicates the countries in the
sample, t the annual observation, and j the episode of ﬁscal contraction or expansion. For each episode, the
samples include observations from two years before to two years after the ﬁscal contraction or expansion;
hence t   [T   2 T   2]. In equation (1), the coefﬁcients  1  2  3  4 measure the change of the left-
hand side variable relatively to its mean at T   2. I estimate (1) by OLS and correct the standard errors for
heteroskedasticity.11
Column(1)ofTable1showsestimatesoftheequationforthenominalinterestrateof10-yeargovernment
bonds. The coefﬁcients of the dummy variables T IMET j are all negative in the sample ofﬁscal contractions
and positive in the sample of ﬁscal expansions. The 10-year government bonds interest rate decreases in each
period relatively to its value in T   2 around times of tight ﬁscal policy and it increases when governments’
ﬁscal position worsens. The change of the interest rate gets larger as time goes by and, while 1 and  2 are not
statistically signiﬁcant,  3 and  4 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. Overall,
from T   2 to T   2, INT10Y falls by 124 basis points in ﬁscal contractions and raises by 162 basis points
in ﬁscal expansions. These results are consistent with some recent empirical literature.12
trend inﬂation to the nominal interest rate. I also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the difference
between the nominal interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post inﬂation rate. I, then, average over the year the quarterly
data.
11As part of the sensitivity analysis, I also estimate the benchmark speciﬁcations in Tables 1 and 2 relaxing the assumption that
 ijt is iid and allowing the error term to be correlated within countries or years. Results are robust.
12For example, Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) estimate a vector autoregressive system including the 10-year government bonds
10Evidence along the same line is in column (2), where the left-hand side variable is the 3-month Treasury
bills nominal interest rate. The latter varies by 103 basis points in ﬁscal stabilizations and by 158 basis points
in ﬁscal expansions from T   2 to T   2. However, at no time horizon the fall in INT3M is statistically
signiﬁcant in the sample of ﬁscal adjustments, while only 4 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level during
episodes of ﬁscal expansions. This result is also consistent with the existent empirical literature that does not
ﬁnd a robust statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁscal policy variables and short-term interest rates
(see, for example, Evans (1987), and Mountford and Uhlig (2005), and Gale and Orszag (2002) for a recent
review of the literature).
The results for the real interest rates of the 10-year government bonds and of the 3-month Treasury
bills are similar to those for the nominal interest rates. However, the coefﬁcients of the dummy variable
T IMEijT 2 in columns (3) and (4) are smaller, in absolute value, than in columns (1) and (2). This implies
that the cumulative changes from T   2 to T   2 of RINT10Y and RINT3M are smaller than those of
INT10Y and INT3M.
interest rate, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate, the inﬂation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio
and the public debt-to-GDP ratio. They ﬁnd that in OECD countries a one percentage point increase in the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP
ratio leads to an increase of the 10-year government bonds interest rate of 7 basis points on impact, and to a cumulative increase of
66 basis points after ﬁve years. On average, from T   2 to T   2, the cyclically adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio improves
by 2 percentage points in the sample of ﬁscal contractions and worsens by 3 percentage points in ﬁscal expansions. Using estimates
from the VAR speciﬁcation in Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004), one predicts a decrease of the 10-year government bonds interest
rate by 132 basis points over a ﬁve year window in ﬁscal contractions, and an increase by 198 basis points in ﬁscal expansions.
These numbers are quite close in magnitude to the changes in INT10Y from T   2 to T   2 predicted in column (1) of Table 1
(i.e. -124 basis points in ﬁscal contractions and 166 basis points in ﬁscal expansions). Note, however, that estimates are only roughly
comparable because of the different types of experiments conducted in the papers. Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) study the effect
of an unanticipated one period shock to the government primary deﬁcit. In column (1) of Table 1, the coefﬁcients  1  2  3  4
measurethechangeoftheleft-handside variablerelativelytoits mean atT 2and from T 2to T 2the government deﬁcit-to-GDP
ratio continuously changes.
11Lets’ now turn to results in columns (5)-(7). The coefﬁcients  1  2  3  4 are never statistically signif-
icant when equation (1) is estimated for the discount rate (column (5)). Moreover, data do not show a clear
decreasing or increasing pattern as in the case of interest rates on public debt, especially in the sample of
ﬁscal expansions. Either the LI BOR or the average interest rate of corporate bonds are, instead, signiﬁcantly
different (at least at the 10% level) at T, T   1 and T   2 from their values at T   2 either in the sample of
ﬁscal contractions or in the one of ﬁscal expansions.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 investigate the behavior of stock markets. The evidence is
consistent with the one for interest rates. The MSCI share price index and its growth rate increase around
episodes of ﬁscal contractions and fall around periods of ﬁscal expansions. For example, in times of ﬁscal
expansions, the average growth rate of the MSCI share price index is 12.6% atT  2, and it decreases by about
16%, 18%, 10% and 14% in T   1, T, T   1 and T   2. Note, however, that the coefﬁcients  1  2  3  4
are statistically signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation for the MSCI share price index only in the sample of ﬁscal
contractions. In ﬁscal expansions,  1  2  3  4 are signiﬁcant only for the speciﬁcation for the growth rate
of the share price index.
3.2 A reparametrization of the basic speciﬁcations
The absolute values of the coefﬁcients of the dummy variables T IMET j seem to decrease or increase
continuously from T   2 to T   2 for the regressions of all ﬁnancial variables with statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients. To better capture this evidence, Table 2 estimates a reparametrized version of equation (1):
Financialijt    i     FISCALijt    ijt (2)
where FISCAL is equal to 1 two years before a ﬁscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the
time of the ﬁscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. This speciﬁcation has
the advantage of being more compact and more convenient when estimating the regressions in the following
sections that include more variables on the right-hand side of equation (2). However, it constraints the change
12of the left-hand side variable to be of the same magnitude from one period to the next.
As expected from the results in Table 1, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL is negative in ﬁscal contractions and
positive (except for the regression of DISCR) in ﬁscal expansions when I investigate the reaction of interest
rates to changes in the ﬁscal stance. It is positive in ﬁscal contractions and negative in ﬁscal expansions when
the share price index or its growth rate are on the left-hand side of (2) (see Table 2, Part I).13
In Part II of Table 2, I introduce among the regressors the value of the left-hand side variable at T   2.
This checks that the opposite behavior of interest rates and stock market prices observed around episodes of
ﬁscal contractions and expansions is not due to differences in the initial levels of the left-hand side variables.
Figures 2 and 3 show, in fact, that interest rates are higher and stock market prices are lower before the
occurrence of a ﬁscal contraction than before a ﬁscal expansion. However, controlling for the initial values
of the left-hand side variables does not alter the nature of the results discussed so far. In the sample of ﬁscal
contractions results are even stronger than in Part I of Table II.
In summary, estimates in Tables 1 and 2 support the evidence in Figures 2 and 3 and show that there is
a negative (positive) correlation between changes in governments’ primary balance and interest rates (stock
markets data). This is not due to time-invariant country speciﬁc characteristics or to differences in the initial
values of interest rates and stock market prices around episodes of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions.
Before checking that conclusions reached so far hold when I include additional variables on the right-hand
side of equation (2), the next section relates the evidence shown to some relevant theory.
3.3 Discussion
There are several channels through which ﬁscal shocks can be transmitted to the macroeconomy via ﬁnancial
markets. While testing the validity of different theoretical models is beyond the scope of this work (and so
is an exhaustive summary of the theoretical literature), in this section I review very brieﬂy the predictions of
13See section 4.6 for speciﬁcations that also control for time effects.
13some relevant theory to offer a possible interpretation of the results presented so far.
In a standard IS-LM model, expansionary ﬁscal policies lead to a ceteris paribus increase in aggregate
demand and short-term interest rates while the effect on long-term interest rates depends also on the expec-
tation of the future ﬁscal policy stance. Because ﬁnancial markets are forward looking, both current and
expected future short-term interest rates matter. As an example, assume that the current deﬁcit increases and
expectations of future deﬁcits are also higher, then both current and future short-term interest rates increase,
leading to higher long-term interest rates in the current period.
Two arguments go against this view. First, if economies are open and there is perfect capital mobility
among countries, the real interest rate in eachcountry depends only on the aggregate stance ofﬁscal policy. In
fact, a decrease in national saving due to the increase in government deﬁcit will be ﬁnanced by capital inﬂows
from abroad. This eliminates the pressure on domestic interest rates. Second, if Ricardian equivalence holds,
consumers anticipate that taxes will increase in the future because governments have to pay back the debt
issued to ﬁnance the deﬁcit increase. Private consumption does not change, but private saving increases and
compensates for the decrease in government saving. As a consequence, real interest rates do not change.
Finally, agents’ perception about the impact of current ﬁscal policy on the sustainability of government
debt can also be important to explain the effect of ﬁscal shocks on ﬁnancial variables. The so-called “expec-
tation view”, elaborated to explain why some, but not all, ﬁscal adjustments have expansionary effects on the
economy, predicts that ﬁscal stabilizations may be expansionary if agents believe that the ﬁscal tightening
generates a change in regime that “eliminates the need for larger, maybe much more disruptive adjustments
in the future” (Blanchard (1990)). Suppose, for example, that agents think that a stabilization in the current
period is credible and avoids a default on government debt, they can ask for a lower premium on government
bonds. Private demand components sensitive to the real interest rate can increase if the reduction in the in-
terest rate paid on government bonds leads to a reduction in the real interest rate charged to consumers and
ﬁrms. The decrease in interest rate can also lead to the appreciation of stocks and bonds, increasing agents’
14ﬁnancial wealth, and triggering a consumption/investment boom. Moreover, if agents have quite a substantial
share of their wealth in government bonds, they can be willing to consume and invest more also because the
adjustment removes the uncertainty about the “availability” of this part of their wealth.
Based on the empirical evidence presented in the previous sections, the size and the signiﬁcance of the
estimated coefﬁcients  1  2  3  4 in (1) or of   in (2) predict a positive (negative) correlation between
interest rates (stock market indicators) and ﬁscal policy shocks. Sharp changes in the stance of ﬁscal policy
have the largest and most signiﬁcant impact on long-term interest rates of government bonds, but, ﬁscal
consolidations and expansions also affect interest rates measuring borrowing costs for consumers and ﬁrms
and stock market prices. This evidence is interesting and it is consistent with theoretical models such as a
standard IS-LM model, models of risk premium, or with the so-called “expectation view”. From the empirical
analysis conducted in this paper, it is not possible to discriminate among these different theoretical models.
However, to provide more evidence on the channels and circumstances through which large changes in the
primarybalanceaffectinterestratesandstockmarketsindicators, inthenextsection,Ialsoinvestigatewhether
the response of ﬁnancial variables to ﬁscal shocks depends on the different types of ﬁscal contractions or
expansions (e.g.: credible versus non credible changes in the ﬁscal stance; ﬁscal contractions/expansions
based on expenditure cuts versus tax changes).
4 Extensions and robustness
Results shown are robust to a variety of speciﬁcation changes. In what follows, I extend the analysis in section
3 to account for countries’ initial ﬁscal conditions, characteristics of ﬁscal consolidations and expansions,
macroeconomic conditions, other economic policies, and future ﬁscal policy conditions. I, then, summarize
the results of additional robustness checks. For brevity sake, in this section, I present only tables for the
sample of ﬁscal contractions. Tables for the sample of ﬁscal expansions are available upon request and are
also shown in the working paper version of this paper.
154.1 Countries’ ﬁscal position
The response of ﬁnancial markets to ﬁscal contractions and expansions can be different in countries with
low/high levels of government deﬁcit or public debt. In fact, markets can react only when they perceive
that the change in ﬁscal policy affects the likelihood of a default crisis, which, very likely, is correlated with
the level of the deﬁcit or with the stock of public debt. To investigate this possibility, I include among the
right-hand side variables of equation (2) the value of the government deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio (DEF) or of the
public debt-to-GDP ratio (DEBT) at time T   2 alone, or together with an interaction term between DEF
or DEBT and the variable FISCAL.
Controlling for countries’ initial ﬁscal position does not alter in any relevant way the size and the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of FISCAL relatively to the estimates in Table 2 (see Part I of Table 3).14
Instead, I ﬁnd an asymmetry between episodes of ﬁscal contractions and expansions when I also include the
interaction term between DEF or DEBT and the variable FISCAL on the right-hand side of (2). In the
sample ofﬁscalexpansions, the coefﬁcients ofthe interactionterms FISCAL DEF and FISCAL DEBT
are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional critical values. This suggests that the effect ofﬁscal expansions
on ﬁnancial variables does not depend on countries’ initial ﬁscal conditions. Hence, the econometric spec-
iﬁcations estimated so far well capture the response of ﬁnancial variables around periods of large budget
deteriorations. Instead, initial conditions seem to matter for the response ofﬁnancial markets to ﬁscal shocks
in episodes of ﬁscal contractions. In fact, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL looses signiﬁcance in almost all regres-
sions, but the coefﬁcients of FISCAL   DEF and FISCAL   DEBT are statistically signiﬁcant at least
in one of the two speciﬁcations and for the regressions of all variables except DISCR (see Table 3, Part II).
Hence, the decrease in interest rates and the increase in stock market prices are larger the higher the initial
14Note that the coefﬁcient of DEBT is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions for interest rates and positive in those
for stock market prices. Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) and Caporale and Williams (2002) ﬁnd the same result and explain it as
consequence of a liquidity effect.
16levels of government deﬁcit and/or public debt.
4.2 Composition of ﬁscal manoeuvre
Alesina and Perotti (1997), Ardagna (2004a), McDermott and Wescott (1996), among others, suggest that the
credibility of a ﬁscal consolidation depends also on its composition. Fiscal contractions that are achieved by
cutting public spending more than by increasing tax rates are more likely to be long-lasting. Governments
that reduce transfers, governmentwages, public employment are perceived to be committed to solve theﬁscal
imbalance, because they undertake policy measures with more permanent effects on the budget. Moreover,
Alesina et al. (2002) show that proﬁts increase in response to cuts of government spending, but decrease
when taxes increase. Following these arguments, I checked ifﬁnancial markets react differently to ﬁscal con-
tractions (expansions) that sharply decrease (increase) government spending by estimating three alternative
speciﬁcations of equation (2). Results are in Table 4.
First, I introduce among the regressors of equation (2), the change of the cyclically adjusted primary
expenditure-to-GDP ratio ( PREXP) or the change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and govern-
ment wage payments-to-GDP (  T RANSF  CGW ). Second, I deﬁne the following dummy variables: (i)
EXPLOW1 equal to 1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio
is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample ofﬁscal contractions (ﬁscal expansions) and zero oth-
erwise; (ii) EXPHIGH1 equal to 1   EXPLOW1; (iii) EXPLOW2 equal to 1 if the decrease (increase)
of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers andgovernment wage payments-to-GDP is larger (smaller) than the
median change in the sample of ﬁscal contractions (ﬁscal expansions) and zero otherwise; (iv) EXPHIGH2
equal to 1   EXPLOW2. I introduce among the regressors of equation (2) EXPLOW1 or EXPLOW2
in the sample of ﬁscal contractions and EXPHIGH1 or EXPHIGH2 when I estimate the speciﬁcations
for the sample of ﬁscal expansions. Third, I estimate equation (2) not only adding among the regressors the
dummy variables, but also interacting them with the variable FISCAL.
17Let’s begin by discussing the estimates in Part I and II of Table 4. First, the qualitative nature of the
results shown so far holds. In fact, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL is close to the one in Table 2. Second, when the
estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant, I ﬁnd a positive correlation between changes in government
spending and interest rates and a negative correlation between  PREXP or   T RANSF   CGW  and
MSCI or MSCIGR. Hence, sharper cuts to primary spending and to transfers and governments’ wage bills
are associated with lower interest rates and higher stock markets prices. Third, Part II suggests that changes
in transfers and the governments’ wage bills have a larger effect on ﬁnancial variables than changes in the
overall primary spending. These conclusions are also conﬁrmed in the sample of ﬁscal expansions.
More evidence along the same lines is in Part III of Table 4. Consider, for example, results in column
1 for the speciﬁcation that includes the dummy variable EXPLOW2. The 10-year nominal interest rate of
government bonds decreases, on average, in each period, by 55 basis points, for a total decrease, from T   2
to T   2, of about 220 basis points if the dummy variable EXPLOW2 is equal to 1. INT10Y, instead,
falls only by 19 basis points per period, and by a total of 76 basis points, if transfers and the government
wage bill change by less than the median value in the sample. Also, while the t-statistics of the coefﬁcient of
FISCAL   EXPLOW2 is equal to -2.54, the one of FISCAL   EXPHIGH2 is equal to 1.19.
4.3 Macroeconomic conditions
This section investigates the role played by macroeconomic conditions. I introduce on the right-hand side of
equation (2) the growth rate of real GDP (GROWT H), or of the output gap, and the inﬂation rate (INFL)
at T   2 and their yearly change to control for the initial macroeconomic conditions and for the changes in
the macroeconomic fundamentals that happen from T  2 to T  2. Results for the speciﬁcations that include
the variable GROWT H are shown in Table 5; results for the speciﬁcations with the output gap are available
upon request.
In Table 5, the coefﬁcients of FISCAL are close in size to the values in Table 2. In the sample of ﬁscal
18contractions, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the regression for
INT3M, and at the 10% level in the regression for CORP, while it was insigniﬁcant in Table 2. However,
in the sample of ﬁscal expansions, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL becomes insigniﬁcant in the regressions for
RINT3M and MSCI, while it was signiﬁcant at the 10% level in Table 2. Finally, when I substitute the
variable GROWT H with the output gap the coefﬁcients of FISCAL and their signiﬁcance are very close to
the ones in Table 5.
4.4 The policy mix
An alternative explanation for the decrease (increase) of interest rates and increase (decrease) of stock mar-
ket prices around episodes of ﬁscal contractions (expansions) is that governments implement these changes
in ﬁscal policy with other economic measures that move ﬁnancial variables in the observed directions, and,
hence, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL would not capture the effect of the large changes in the ﬁscal stance but
the effect of omitted variables. To address this concern, I estimate equation (2) by adding among the regres-
sors variables that capture the stance of monetary policy, the extent of ﬁnancial liberalization, international
ﬁnancial integration, and exchange rate movements.
First, I estimate equation (2) for INT10Y, RINT10Y, LI BOR, CORP, MSCI, MSCIGR by in-
cluding among the regressors the initial values of the discount rate, of the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate,
and their yearly change to control for monetary policy.15 Results are very similar to those in Table 2 (see
Table 6). Hence, the evidence shown so far is not due to omitting variables measuring the stance of mone-
tary policy.16 It is also interesting to note that the coefﬁcients of FISCAL in the regressions for MSCI or
15Data availability and comparability across countries constraints the choice of the indicators of the monetary policy stance. Fol-
lowing the suggestion of one of the referees, I have also estimated equation (2) by including among the regressors the initial value of
M2 and its yearly change to control for the stance of monetary policy. Results not shown but available upon request are robust to this
speciﬁcation change.
16This result should come at no surprise since the coefﬁcient of FISCAL is never statistically signiﬁcant in the discount rate
19MSCIGR are still positive (negative) in ﬁscal contractions (expansions) when controlling for the discount
rate or the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate. This seems to suggest thatﬁscal discipline has an effect on the
stock market beyond the effect that it has on interest rates. For example, the stock market can react in view
of higher proﬁtability. Both current and expected lower taxes or lower public spending can, in fact, boost
proﬁts.17
Second, I include on the right-hand side of (2) the initial values of the growth of the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate (EXCHGR), a measure of the extent of international integration of capital markets
(INT INT EGR), a measure of ﬁnancial liberalization (FIN LI B), and the yearly change of these three
variables. The variable INT INT EGR is an index constructed with data provided by Milesi-Ferretti and
following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). Speciﬁcally, INT INT EGR is a variable ranging from 0 to 4
and increasing in the degree of restrictions to the international integration of capital markets. It is available
for all countries in the sample from 1966 to 1997 and it is equal to the sum of different dummy variables
measuring the existence of restrictions on the capital account, on the current account and the existence of
multiple exchange rates. The variable FIN LI B is by Levine et al. (2000). It is equal to the ratio of commer-
cial banks assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. A higher value of this ratio implies a
greater degree of ﬁnancial liberalization.
Results in Table 7 suggest that restrictions on the current and capital accounts lead to higher interest rates
and that reforms that liberalize ﬁnancial markets have the opposite effect. The coefﬁcient of the growth of the
nominal exchange rate has, instead, opposite sign in the samples of ﬁscal contractions and ﬁscal expansions,
giving an ambiguous picture on the effect of devaluations/appreciations of the exchange rate.18 More impor-
tantly, the size and the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients of FISCAL are very close to their values in Table 2
in the sample of ﬁscal contractions. However, results are weaker when I concentrate on the sample of ﬁscal
equation and it is often insigniﬁcant in the INT3M equation.
17See Alesina et al. (2002) on the effect of government spending and taxation on proﬁts.
18A minus sign of the coefﬁcient of EXCHGR indicates a nominal devaluation.
20expansions. Most likely, this is due to the loss of degree of freedom since the number of observations drops
almost by half relatively to the one in Table 2.
4.5 Do ﬁnancial markets react in anticipation of improved government debt’s sustainability?
Consider a credible ﬁscal contraction, that is one in which agents believe that the government is able to
generate a persistent decrease in public debt. As Alesina et al. (1992) show, in a model with two equilibria,
a credible ﬁscal adjustment can move the economy from a “bad” equilibrium to a “good” one. In the bad
equilibrium, public debt is increasing and the default risk is rational since investors demand a risk premium.
Interest rates on government bonds increase making default more likely. In the good equilibrium, instead,
public debt falls, the risk premium decreases,interest rates are low and investors’ conﬁdence in governments’
ability to honor debt is rational. Hence, a ﬁscal adjustment that moves the economy from the bad to the good
equilibrium can generate a sharp decrease in interest rates. Similarly, aﬁscal expansion that is perceived to be
long lasting with dramatic effects on the stock of public debt can generate a strong increase in interest rates.
In what follows, I look at the path of public debt few years after the episodes of large changes in the ﬁscal
stance and provide some evidence in favor of Alesina et al. (1992).
First, I introduce among the regressors of equation (2) the change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from
the last year of the ﬁscal contraction or ﬁscal expansion to two ( DEBTT 2) or three ( DEBTT 3) years
after. Second, I separate episodes using the criteria in McDermott and Wescott (1996) or in Alesina and
Perotti (1995). Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne the following dummy variables: (i) DEBT LOW1 equal to 1 if, two
years after the last year of the ﬁscal contraction (ﬁscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has
declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; (ii) DEBT HIGH1 equal to
1 DEBT LOW1; (iii) DEBT LOW2equalto1if,threeyearsafterthelastyearoftheﬁscalcontraction(ﬁs-
cal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5 percentage points
and zero otherwise; (iv) DEBT HIGH2 equal to 1   DEBT LOW2. I introduce among the regressors of
21equation (2) DEBT LOW1 or DEBT LOW2 in Part II of Table 7 (and DEBT HIGH1 or DEBT HIGH2
when I estimate the speciﬁcations for the sample of ﬁscal expansions). Third, I estimate equation (2) not only
adding the dummy variables, but also interacting them with the variable FISCAL.
Overall, results support the theoretical prediction by Alesina et al. (1992) in the panel of ﬁscal contrac-
tions (Table 8), but evidence is murkier in the panel of ﬁscal expansions. Financial markets seem to react in
anticipation of the future path of government debt-to-GDP ratio: the higher the decline in public debt after
ﬁscal contractions, the lower the interest rates and the higher the stock market price index and its growth rate.
For example, a decline of the public debt-to-GDP ratio by one percentage point is associated with an addi-
tional decrease of the 10-year government bonds interest rate of about 16 basis points (see Table 8, Part I).
Interestingly, when I investigate if the effect of large changes of the government budget on ﬁnancial variables
depends on the decrease of public debt in the future, Iﬁnd that interest rates decrease and that the stock market
reacts positively only when governments are successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. In fact, in Table
8, Part III, the coefﬁcients of FISCAL   DEBT LOW1 and FISCAL   DEBT LOW2 are statistically
signiﬁcant, but the coefﬁcients of FISCAL   DEBT HIGH1 and FISCAL   DEBT HIGH2 are not.
However, this evidence is not conﬁrmed in the sample of ﬁscal expansions.
4.6 Additional robustness checks
This section summarizes the results of additional robustness checks. Results are not shown and are available
upon request. First, I estimate equation (2) controlling for the time dimension. Figure 1 shows that the dis-
tribution of ﬁscal contractions and expansions over time is not uniform. Fiscal expansions are more frequent
in the seventies and in the last years of the sample, while ﬁscal contractions are more common in the eighties
and nineties. Following this evidence, I deﬁne ﬁve dummy variables respectively equal to 1 in 1960-1969,
1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2002 and zero otherwise. I include them on the right-hand side of
(2). Results show that the size and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of FISCAL are not unduly sensitive to this
22speciﬁcation change. In the sample of ﬁscal contractions, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL in the regression of
RINT10Y is not signiﬁcant and the one of LI BOR is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. In the sample of
ﬁscal expansions, results are even stronger than the ones in Table 2.
Second, I estimate equation (2) using two alternative criteria to select episodes of ﬁscal contractions and
expansions. Speciﬁcally, episodes of largeﬁscal contractions (expansions) are deﬁned as: (i) periods in which
the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1 per cent of GDP per year; (ii) periods
in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (worsens) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP per year.
The ﬁrst less demanding rule identiﬁes 118 years of ﬁscal contractions and 97 periods of ﬁscal expansions,
while there are 65 periods of ﬁscal contractions and 55 episodes of ﬁscal expansions according to deﬁnition
(ii). When (i) is used, results are very close to those in Table 2 even though the size of the coefﬁcients is
slightly smaller. When the tighter deﬁnition is used changes in the stance of ﬁscal policy have larger effects
on ﬁnancial variables in periods of ﬁscal contractions. In the sample of ﬁscal expansions, however, the size
of the coefﬁcients is, in general, smaller and the coefﬁcients of INT10Y and RINT10Y are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Third, results are not sensitive to a particular country in the sample, In fact, dropping one country at a
time does not alter the estimates of equation (2).
Fourth, I check if results are sensitive to including in the samples a different number of years before or
after the occurrence ofﬁscal contractions/expansions. The qualitative nature of the results does not change if I
extend the window and include three periods before and after the occurrence of aﬁscal contraction/expansion,
or if I include observations from T   2 to T   1. Instead, if I include in the samples only observations
starting from T  1, the coefﬁcient of FISCAL looses signiﬁcance in many regressions. However, its sign is
23consistent with results in Table 2.19
Finally, I include among the regressors of equation (2) most of the variables that have been separately
added in sections 4.1-4.5. In particular, I estimate equation (2) controlling for: (i) countries’ initial ﬁscal
position by including the value of the government deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio (DEF), (ii) the composition of the
ﬁscal consolidation/expansion by adding the change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and gov-
ernment wage payments-to-GDP (  T RANSF   CGW ), (iii) the macroeconomic situation by adding all
the variables in Table 6, (iv) the policy-mix by including all the variables in Table 7, (v) the change of the
public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the ﬁscal contraction or ﬁscal expansion to three years after
( DEBTT 3). Despite the sharp decrease in the number of observations and in the degrees of freedom, the
coefﬁcient of FISCAL in the sample of ﬁscal contractions remains negative (positive) and statistically sig-
niﬁcant as in Table 2 when I estimate regressions for interest rates (MSCI index and its growth rate). The
size of the coefﬁcients is also larger than in the benchmark model. In the sample of ﬁscal expansions, results
are once again less strong.
5 Conclusions
This paper concentrates on episodes of largeﬁscal consolidations and expansions occurred in OECDcountries
from 1960 to 2002 and shows that interest rates fall and stock market prices increase around episodes ofﬁscal
consolidations; the opposite occurs around periods of ﬁscal expansions. In addition, the paper suggests that
ﬁnancial markets’ response to large changes in the ﬁscal stance depends on countries’ initial ﬁscal positions
and on the nature of ﬁscal contractions. Fiscal adjustments that occur in country-years with high levels of
government deﬁcit, that are implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and
19Iinterpretthis asevidencethatﬁnancialmarketsanticipatetheoccurrenceofﬁscalcontractions andexpansions. Hence, including
in the samples only observations starting from one year before does not allow us to fully capture the effect of the large swings inﬁscal
policy on ﬁnancial variables.
24substantial decrease in government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in
stock market prices. In the sample of ﬁscal contractions, results are robust to controlling for inﬂation, GDP
growth and indicators of monetary and ﬁnancial liberalization policies. In the sample of ﬁscal expansions,
results are somewhat less robust to speciﬁcation changes.
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Table 1: Financial markets, fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
  Fiscal Contractions 
TIMET-1   -0.0029  -0.0049  -0.0022  -0.0040  -0.0002  -0.0118  -0.0035  0.0705  0.0234 
  (-0.48)  (-0.66)  (-0.44)  (-0.65)  (-0.04)  (-1.50)  (-0.57)  (0.43)  (0.57) 
TIMET  -0.0082  -0.0078  -0.0054  -0.0046  -0.0057  -0.0144  -0.0068  0.2751  0.0878 
  (-1.61)  (-1.21)  (-1.29)  (-0.85)  (-0.97)  (-2.10)**  (-1.23)  (1.95)*  (2.66)** 
TIMET+1  -0.0106  -0.0085  -0.0082  -0.0047  -0.0041  -0.0143  -0.0058  0.3571  0.0443 
  (-1.74)*  (-1.15)  (-1.64)*  (-0.74)  (-0.59)  (-1.81)*  (-0.89)  (2.23)**  (1.16) 
TIMET+2  -0.0124  -0.0103  -0.0097  -0.0076  0.0016  -0.0194  -0.0063  0.4172  0.0323 
  (-2.05)**  (-1.38)  (-1.94)*  (-1.20)  (0.23)  (-2.43)**  (-0.94)  (2.61)**  (0.79) 
Constant  0.1213  0.1145  0.1034  0.0960  0.1197  0.1130  0.1181  4.7753  0.0274 
  (17.10)**  (11.03)**  (16.53)**  (10.86)**  (11.32)**  (6.95)**  (13.92)**  (29.83)**  (0.58) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.34  0.36  0.32  0.37  0.44  0.40  0.34  0.44  0.10 
                   
  Fiscal Expansions 
TIMET-1   0.0057  0.0124  0.0051  0.0106  0.0029  0.0154  0.0086  -0.0251  -0.1576 
  (0.86)  (1.54)  (0.95)  (1.58)  (0.34)  (1.56)  (1.33)  (-0.12)  (-3.36)** 
TIMET  0.0089  0.0088  0.0084  0.0112  -0.0036  0.0056  0.0140  -0.1048  -0.1796 
  (1.40)  (1.23)  (1.59)  (1.84)*  (-0.44)  (0.66)  (2.20)**  (-0.54)  (-4.22)** 
TIMET+1  0.0122  0.0111  0.0102  0.0096  0.0021  0.0105  0.0146  -0.2614  -0.0974 
  (1.67)*  (1.30)  (1.68)*  (1.39)  (-0.23)  (0.93)  (1.83)*  (-1.21)  (-1.93)* 
TIMET+2  0.0162  0.0158  0.0142  0.0143  -0.0017  0.0110  0.0165  -0.3364  -0.1405 
  (2.37)**  (1.92)*  (2.47)**  (2.09)**  (-0.21)  (1.15)  (2.12)**  (-1.59)  (-2.93)** 
Constant  0.0923  0.0807  0.0755  0.0617  0.0997  0.0944  0.0919  5.0529  0.1258 
  (11.79)**  (6.80)**  (9.24)**  (5.09)**  (8.11)**  (5.18)**  (9.57)**  (21.69)**  (2.62)** 
N. of obs.  226  213  226  213  196  185  184  223  220 
R
2  0.29  0.30  0.29  0.34  0.31  0.27  0.28  0.40  0.14 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
TIMET-j are four dummy variables equal to 1 when j=-1,0,1,2 respectively and zero otherwise. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. 
Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis.   32
 
Table 2: Financial markets, fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
  Fiscal Contractions 
FISCAL  -0.0033  -0.0024  -0.0025  -0.0016  -0.0002  -0.0041  -0.0015  0.1119  0.0084 
  (-2.40)**  (-1.44)  (-2.27)**  (-1.11)  (-0.12)  (-2.33)**  (-1.03)  (3.15)**  (0.91) 
Constant  0.1240  0.1151  0.1059  0.0964  0.1177  0.1131  0.1178  4.6722  0.0481 
  (17.36)**  (11.08)**  (16.72)**  (10.80)**  (10.97)**  (6.91)**  (13.95)**  (29.16)**  (0.93) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.34  0.36  0.32  0.37  0.44  0.40  0.33  0.44  0.08 
                   
  Fiscal Expansions 
FISCAL  0.0039  0.0030  0.0034  0.0028  -0.0004  0.0017  0.0040  -0.0894  -0.0234 
  (2.51)**  (1.64)*  (2.60)**  (1.82)*  (-0.24)  (0.77)  (2.31)**  (-1.89)*  (-2.10)** 
Constant  0.0893  0.0810  0.0731  0.0626  0.1004  0.0970  0.0911  5.1824  0.0702 
  (11.10)**  (6.38)**  (8.60)**  (4.83)**  (8.06)**  (5.12)**  (9.00)**  (22.43)**  (1.38) 
N. of obs.  226  213  226  213  196  185  184  223  220 
R
2  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.33  0.31  0.26  0.27  0.40  0.07 
                   
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
  Fiscal Contractions 
FISCAL  -0.0035  -0.0030  -0.0027  -0.0020  -0.0010  -0.0046  -0.0026  0.1315  0.0090 
  (-4.00)**  (-2.78)**  (-3.47)**  (-2.14)**  (-0.87)  (-3.72)**  (-2.52)**  (7.77)**  (0.97) 
Constant  0.0326  0.0410  0.0341  0.0330  0.0327  0.0281  0.0413  0.3438  0.0505 
  (4.62)**  (5.11)**  (4.74)**  (4.61)**  (3.69)**  (3.53)**  (5.01)**  (2.20)**  (0.99) 
N. of obs.  306  278  306  278  257  261  241  277  277 
R
2  0.72  0.75  0.66  0.71  0.72  0.70  0.66  0.89  0.09 
                   
  Fiscal Expansions 
FISCAL  0.0019  0.0008  0.0020  0.0015  -0.0009  -0.0024  0.0027  0.0056  -0.0267 
  (1.96)**  (0.59)  (2.31)**  (1.24)  (-0.69)  (-1.36)  (2.11)**  (0.37)  (-2.46)** 
Constant  -0.0004  -0.0054  0.0055  -0.0010  0.0229  -0.0111  0.0113  0.0630  0.0747 
  (-0.05)  (-0.44)  (0.75)  (-0.09)  (1.81)*  (-0.57)  (0.84)  (0.43)  (1.48) 
N. of obs.  223  211  223  211  196  175  184  223  205 
R
2  0.76  0.70  0.70  0.67  0.61  0.66  0.58  0.95  0.10 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. See 
section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 3: The role of countries’ initial fiscal position in periods of fiscal contractions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0031  -0.0018  -0.0024  -0.0011  0.0001  -0.0036  -0.0015  0.1116  0.0117 
  (-2.31)**  (-1.15)  (-2.22)**  (-0.81)  (0.08)  (-2.08)**  (-1.04)  (3.11)**  (1.28) 
DEFT-2  0.2401  0.3884  0.2796  0.3961  0.1862  0.1989  0.0324  5.2456  1.2250 
  (3.36)**  (5.08)**  (5.10)**  (6.63)**  (2.22)**  (2.25)**  (0.33)  (2.52)**  (2.80)** 
Constant  0.1111  0.0933  0.0910  0.0745  0.1072  0.1003  0.1162  4.4030  -0.0248 
  (13.85)**  (8.44)**  (13.17)**  (7.91)**  (9.31)**  (5.80)**  (11.60)**  (23.25)**  (-0.43) 
N. of obs.  301  282  301  282  252  263  245  284  280 
R
2  0.36  0.40  0.37  0.42  0.43  0.39  0.34  0.45  0.11 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0038  -0.0026  -0.0030  -0.0017  -0.0006  -0.0041  -0.0028  0.1285  0.0151 
  (-2.80)**  (-1.58)  (-2.64)**  (-1.18)  (-0.38)  (-2.63)**  (-1.91)*  (4.22)**  (1.57) 
DEBTT-2  -0.0594  -0.0476  -0.0401  -0.0283  -0.0426  -0.1031  -0.0534  2.9165  0.0373 
  (-4.93)**  (-3.06)**  (-4.10)**  (-2.23)**  (-2.79)**  (-8.30)**  (-4.25)**  (13.82)**  (0.46) 
Constant  0.1116  0.0823  0.0993  0.0693  0.0724  0.1012  0.0922  4.5082  0.0190 
  (16.74)**  (9.58)**  (16.82)**  (9.33)**  (11.08)**  (11.58)**  (12.79)**  (42.67)**  (0.39) 
N. of obs.  265  254  265  254  216  239  226  248  244 
R
2  0.40  0.38  0.35  0.35  0.47  0.55  0.43  0.68  0.11 
                   
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0002  0.0008  -0.0008  0.0001  0.0025  -0.0012  0.0029  0.0589  -0.0072 
  (-0.10)  (0.34)  (-0.48)  (0.07)  (1.14)  (-0.45)  (1.68)*  (0.98)  (-0.50) 
FISCAL*DEFT-2  -0.0634  -0.0558  -0.0357  -0.0256  -0.0494  -0.0519  -0.0937  1.2106  0.4339 
  (-1.67)*  (-1.41)  (-1.18)  (-0.80)  (-1.34)  (-1.08)  (-2.44)**  (1.22)  (1.69)* 
DEFT-2  0.4297  0.5596  0.3864  0.4747  0.3272  0.3569  0.3084  1.5343  -0.1082 
  (3.41)**  (4.05)**  (3.97)**  (4.29)**  (2.51)**  (2.14)**  (2.29)**  (0.41)  (-0.12) 
Constant  0.1026  0.0853  0.0862  0.0708  0.1005  0.0929  0.1032  4.5653  0.0336 
  (11.44)**  (6.96)**  (11.44)**  (6.77)**  (8.21)**  (5.10)**  (10.69)**  (18.90)**  (0.50) 
N. of obs.  301  282  301  282  252  263  245  284  280 
R
2  0.37  0.40  0.38  0.42  0.44  0.40  0.35  0.46  0.12 
                   
FISCAL  0.0005  0.0040  0.0009  0.0047  0.0023  0.0021  0.0017  0.1217  0.0397 
  (0.16)  (1.10)  (0.36)  (1.50)  (0.67)  (0.61)  (0.53)  (1.84)*  (1.83)* 
FISCAL*DEBTT-2  -0.0071  -0.0109  -0.0066  -0.0105  -0.0050  -0.0098  -0.0076  0.0112  -0.0405 
  (-1.79)*  (-2.17)**  (-1.85)*  (-2.37)**  (-1.05)  (-2.02)**  (-1.81)*  (0.12)  (-1.25) 
DEBTT-2  -0.0383  -0.0154  -0.0207  0.0029  -0.0286  -0.0743  -0.0309  2.8826  0.1583 
  (-2.26)**  (-0.75)  (-1.40)  (0.17)  (-1.54)  (-4.26)**  (-1.74)*  (8.60)**  (1.36) 
Constant  0.0988  0.0627  0.0875  0.0503  0.0647  0.0828  0.0789  4.5286  -0.0545 
  (9.81)**  (5.22)**  (9.95)**  (4.81)**  (6.34)**  (7.31)**  (7.38)**  (22.56)**  (-0.75) 
N. of obs.  265  254  265  254  216  239  226  248  244 
R
2  0.41  0.39  0.36  0.36  0.47  0.55  0.44  0.68  0.11 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
DEFT-2 = government deficit-to-GDP ratio at time T-2; DEBTT-2 = public debt-to-GDP ratio at time T-2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal 
expansions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
In  Part  II,  the  magnitude  of  the  change  of  financial  variables  around  periods  of  fiscal  contractions  and  expansions  depends  on the  value  of  DEFT-2  or  DEBTT-2.  For 
exemplification purpose, consider the values in column (1), and assume that a fiscal consolidation happens in a country with DEFT-2 equal to its average value in the sample of 
fiscal contractions at T-2 (i.e.: 4.7 per cent). INT10Y decreases, on average in each period, by 32 basis points (i.e.: -0.0002 + (-0.0634)*(0.047) = -0.0032)   34
Table 4: The composition of fiscal contractions 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0029  -0.0019  -0.0023  -0.0012  0.0005  -0.0036  -0.0015  0.1146  0.0124 
  (-2.17)**  (-1.13)  (-2.05)**  (-0.83)  (0.33)  (-2.07)**  (-1.03)  (3.25)**  (1.38) 
 PREXP  0.1001  0.1281  0.0144  0.0597  0.1822  0.1933  0.1628  -7.9723  -2.7765 
  (0.90)  (0.92)  (0.16)  (0.52)  (1.32)  (1.19)  (1.25)  (-2.59)**  (-3.29)** 
N. of obs.  304  285  304  285  255  266  245  287  283 
R
2  0.33  0.35  0.31  0.36  0.43  0.39  0.34  0.45  0.14 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0029  -0.0019  -0.0023  -0.0012  0.0005  -0.0036  -0.0015  0.1158  0.0120 
  (-2.17)**  (-1.16)  (-2.05)**  (-0.85)  (0.34)  (-2.14)**  (-1.00)  (3.30)**  (1.32) 
 (TRANSF+CGW)  0.5535  0.7561  0.3525  0.5669  0.6540  1.0072  0.4231  -16.8982  -2.6029 
  (2.94)**  (3.35)**  (2.21)**  (2.88)**  (3.20)**  (4.25)**  (1.96)**  (-3.51)**  (-1.98)** 
N. of obs.  304  285  304  285  255  266  245  287  283 
R
2  0.35  0.38  0.33  0.37  0.45  0.42  0.35  0.46  0.11 
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0033  -0.0024  -0.0025  -0.0015  -0.0002  -0.0041  -0.0015  0.1128  0.0084 
  (-2.40)**  (-1.44)  (-2.27)**  (-1.10)  (-0.12)  (-2.35)**  (-1.05)  (3.21)**  (0.91) 
EXPLOW1  0.0033  0.0110  0.0025  0.0093  0.0032  0.0069  0.0049  0.2200  0.0014 
  (0.79)  (2.24)**  (0.71)  (2.20)**  (0.67)  (1.22)  (1.21)  (1.86)*  (0.05) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.34  0.37  0.33  0.38  0.44  0.40  0.34  0.45  0.08 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0033  -0.0025  -0.0026  -0.0017  -0.0003  -0.0041  -0.0015  0.1120  0.0084 
  (-2.56)**  (-1.59)  (-2.41)**  (-1.24)  (-0.18)  (-2.38)**  (-1.00)  (3.19)**  (0.91) 
EXPLOW2  -0.0248  -0.0295  -0.0197  -0.0242  -0.0326  -0.0282  -0.0141  0.3472  -0.0026 
  (-6.06)**  (-5.43)**  (-6.03)**  (-5.39)**  (-6.56)**  (-4.91)**  (-3.25)**  (2.80)**  (-0.09) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.41  0.43  0.40  0.44  0.53  0.45  0.36  0.46  0.08 
PART III  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL*EXPLOW1  -0.0039  -0.0032  -0.0029  -0.0024  -0.0004  -0.0039  -0.0007  0.1138  0.0040 
  (-2.07)**  (-1.40)  (-1.81)*  (-1.20)  (-0.19)  (-1.67)*  (-0.31)  (2.26)**  (0.31) 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH1  -0.0026  -0.0015  -0.0022  -0.0007  0.0001  -0.0044  -0.0022  0.1117  0.0131 
  (-1.36)  (-0.64)  (-1.40)  (-0.36)  (0.03)  (-1.64)*  (-1.12)  (2.28)**  (0.98) 
EXPLOW1  0.0070  0.0162  0.0043  0.0143  0.0046  0.0055  0.0002  0.2136  0.0290 
  (0.79)  (1.50)  (0.59)  (1.57)  (0.45)  (0.47)  (0.02)  (0.87)  (0.49) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.34  0.38  0.33  0.38  0.44  0.40  0.34  0.45  0.08 
                   
FISCAL*EXPLOW2  -0.0055  -0.0041  -0.0048  -0.0033  -0.0006  -0.0052  -0.0036  0.1324  0.0245 
  (-2.54)**  (-1.42)  (-2.66)**  (-1.37)  (-0.23)  (-2.18)**  (-1.62)  (2.15)**  (1.76)* 
FISCAL*EXPHIGH2  -0.0019  -0.0016  -0.0012  -0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0033  -0.0002  0.0989  -0.0017 
  (-1.19)  (-0.85)  (-0.91)  (-0.42)  (-0.04)  (-1.36)  (-0.13)  (2.35)**  (-0.13) 
EXPLOW2  -0.0138  -0.0221  -0.0090  -0.0162  -0.0310  -0.0227  -0.0040  0.2463  -0.0810 
  (-1.53)  (-1.91)*  (-1.21)  (-1.69)*  (-2.98)**  (-1.96)**  (-0.42)  (0.97)  (-1.29) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.42  0.44  0.40  0.44  0.53  0.45  0.36  0.46  0.08 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
 PREXP = change of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP;  (TRANSF+CGW) = change of the ratio of cyclically adjusted transfers and government wage 
payments to GDP; EXPLOW1 =  1 if the decrease (increase) of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure to GDP ratio is larger (smaller) than the median change in the 
sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; EXPHIGH1 = 1-EXPLOW1; EXPLOW2 = 1 if the decrease (increase) of the ratio of cyclically adjusted 
transfers and government wage payments to GDP is larger (smaller) than the median change in the sample of fiscal contractions (fiscal expansions) and zero otherwise; 
EXPHIGH2 = 1-EXPLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in parenthesis.   35
Table 5: Macroeconomic conditions around periods of fiscal contractions 
  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0034  -0.0028  -0.0026  -0.0018  -0.0009  -0.0044  -0.0020  0.1080  0.0093 
  (-3.27)**  (-2.01)**  (-2.75)**  (-1.42)  (-0.72)  (-3.06)**  (-1.69)*  (3.84)**  (1.02) 
GROWTHT-2  0.0370  0.2100  -0.0180  0.1562  0.2678  0.2000  0.3009  1.1465  -0.6260 
  (0.52)  (2.21)**  (-0.27)  (1.75)*  (3.28)**  (1.79)*  (4.55)**  (0.55)  (-0.99) 
INFLT-2  0.4283  0.4422  0.2809  0.2869  0.5171  0.4523  0.4081  -10.6396  0.1361 
  (11.57)**  (8.71)**  (8.21)**  (6.23)**  (11.53)**  (8.41)**  (10.68)**  (-13.76)**  (0.53) 
  GROWTH  -0.0461  -0.1563  -0.0417  -0.1712  0.0044  -0.1887  -0.0766  0.6411  1.5639 
  (-0.74)  (-1.96)**  (-0.69)  (-2.35)**  (0.06)  (-1.79)*  (-1.09)  (0.47)  (2.42)** 
  INFL  -0.0466  0.0092  -0.0837  -0.0972  0.0463  0.0454  -0.0895  0.6305  1.0412 
  (-0.55)  (0.08)  (-1.05)  (-0.89)  (0.48)  (0.35)  (-1.10)  (0.39)  (1.81)* 
Constant  0.0971  0.0819  0.0896  0.0740  0.0771  0.0910  0.0832  5.2854  0.0612 
  (14.03)**  (8.99)**  (12.55)**  (8.64)**  (8.55)**  (7.54)**  (12.48)**  (39.62)**  (1.02) 
N. of obs.  306  287  306  287  257  268  245  289  285 
R
2  0.64  0.61  0.53  0.52  0.69  0.62  0.64  0.67  0.11 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
GROWTHT-2 = real GDP growth rate at T-2; INFLT-2 = inflation rate at time T-2;  GROWTH = change in real GDP growth rate;  INFL = change in inflation rate. See section 
2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 6: Monetary policy and fiscal contractions 
  INT10Y  RINT10Y  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
FISCAL  -0.0028  -0.0020  -0.0039  -0.0016  0.0945  0.0191 
  (-2.59)**  (-2.19)**  (-2.59)**  (-1.29)  (2.57)**  (1.71)* 
DISCRT-2  0.8041  0.6724  0.9406  0.8048  -6.9977  0.2811 
  (17.34)**  (16.89)**  (14.31)**  (12.46)**  (-3.79)**  (0.42) 
 DISCR  0.1493  0.0823  0.3122  0.1276  -1.7963  -0.2874 
  (2.58)**  (1.78)*  (3.77)**  (1.16)  (-0.84)  (-0.35) 
Constant  0.0426  0.0370  0.0283  0.0388  5.4008  -0.0124 
  (6.64)**  (5.98)**  (2.62)**  (4.94)**  (22.94)**  (-0.15) 
N. of obs.  257  257  219  205  240  236 
R
2  0.69  0.68  0.68  0.64  0.51  0.09 
             
             
FISCAL  -0.0036  -0.0028  -0.0046  -0.0026  0.1104  0.0084 
  (-3.70)**  (-3.32)**  (-3.53)**  (-2.23)**  (3.19)**  (0.88) 
INT3MT-2  0.6738  0.5535  0.7718  0.6989  -9.0950  0.5188 
  (17.66)**  (17.20)**  (14.68)**  (10.09)**  (-6.68)**  (1.10) 
 INT3M  0.2546  0.1791  0.6227  0.3231  -2.0619  -1.0638 
  (3.77)**  (3.17)**  (5.98)**  (3.68)**  (-0.93)  (-1.22) 
Constant  0.0642  0.0566  0.0533  0.0577  5.4925  0.0072 
  (10.87)**  (10.14)**  (5.05)**  (6.75)**  (28.98)**  (0.11) 
N. of obs.  278  278  243  225  261  257 
R
2  0.70  0.69  0.73  0.62  0.53  0.09 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index 
(expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or 
expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions 
and fiscal expansions and section 3.5 for variables definitions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-statistics in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 7: The policy-mix around periods of fiscal contractions 
  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y  RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0028  -0.0017  -0.0016  -0.0004  -0.0012  -0.0049  -0.0016  0.1059  0.0236 
  (-2.47)**  (-1.17)  (-1.61)  (-0.31)  (-0.88)  (-2.98)**  (-1.36)  (3.73)**  (2.08)** 
EXCHGRT-2  0.0236  0.0804  0.0834  0.1450  0.1661  -0.0321  0.0869  6.2845  0.2422 
  (0.46)  (1.11)  (1.82)*  (2.25)**  (2.42)**  (-0.42)  (1.58)  (5.24)**  (0.47) 
INT.INTEGR.T-2  0.0185  0.0156  0.0096  0.0070  0.0208  0.0335  0.0250  -0.6006  0.0013 
  (4.60)**  (3.63)**  (2.50)**  (1.75)*  (5.08)**  (5.38)**  (5.25)**  (-11.19)**  (0.04) 
FIN.LIBT-2  -0.0632  -0.2119  -0.0858  -0.2207  -0.1464  -0.1370  0.0541  -4.3828  -0.6238 
  (-1.02)  (-2.51)**  (-1.56)  (-2.76)**  (-2.16)**  (-1.62)  (0.96)  (-4.42)**  (-1.63) 
 EXCHGR  -0.0070  0.0002  -0.0062  0.0098  -0.0268  0.0114  -0.0238  0.9509  0.8514 
  (-0.30)  (0.001)  (-0.31)  (0.38)  (-0.89)  (0.31)  (-1.08)  (1.67)*  (3.74)** 
  INT.INTEGR  -0.0078  -0.0092  -0.0099  -0.0105  -0.0061  -0.0105  -0.0134  -0.0953  0.0517 
  (-0.83)  (-1.49)  (-1.13)  (-2.04)**  (-0.79)  (-1.08)  (-2.30)**  (-1.07)  (0.80) 
 FIN.LIB  -0.0173  -0.1236  -0.0113  -0.0924  -0.0233  -0.1201  0.1167  -1.6348  0.4639 
  (-0.27)  (-1.71)*  (-0.20)  (-1.35)  (-0.33)  (-1.98)**  (1.42)  (-1.50)  (0.67) 
Constant  0.1620  0.2957  0.1750  0.2953  0.2389  0.2308  0.0442  9.6361  0.5898 
  (2.69)**  (3.64)**  (3.28)**  (3.86)**  (3.63)**  (2.77)**  (0.80)  (9.81)**  (1.58) 
N. of obs.  202  197  202  197  196  172  156  194  193 
R
2  0.62  0.65  0.55  0.62  0.67  0.64  0.71  0.69  0.21 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
EXCHGRT-2 = growth rate of the nominal effective exchange rate at T-2 (a minus sign indicates a nominal devaluation); INT.INTEGR T-2 = index measuring extent of 
international integration of capital markets, on the current account and the existence of multiple exchange rates at time T-2; .FIN.LIBT-2 = index measuring extent of financial 
liberalization at time T-2;  EXCHGR = change in EXCHGR;   INT.INTEGR = change in INT.INTEGR;  FIN.LIB = change in FIN.LIB. See section 2.2 for the definition of 
fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions and section 3.5 for variables definitions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. T-
statistics in parenthesis.  38
Table 8: Fiscal contractions and debt sustainability 
PART I  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0040  -0.0023  -0.0032  -0.0014  0.0001  -0.0035  -0.0027  0.0227  0.0158 
  (-2.93)**  (-1.44)  (-2.80)**  (-1.05)  (0.05)  (-2.04)**  (-1.76)*  (3.55)**  (1.72)* 
 DEBT T+2  0.1644  0.1588  0.1249  0.1166  0.0936  0.1548  0.0484  -1.0052  -0.4682 
  (5.86)**  (4.52)**  (5.43)**  (3.92)**  (2.54)**  (3.98)**  (1.11)  (-5.84)**  (-1.87)* 
N. of obs.  270  263  270  263  225  241  227  253  249 
R
2  0.38  0.36  0.36  0.34  0.43  0.41  0.31  0.51  0.13 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0042  -0.0023  -0.0033  -0.0013  -0.0005  -0.0036  -0.0032  0.0268  0.0250 
  (-3.24)**  (-1.41)  (-3.04)**  (-0.93)  (-0.31)  (-2.09)**  (-2.17)**  (4.70)**  (2.69)** 
 DEBT T+3  0.1546  0.1546  0.1166  0.1136  0.1183  0.1729  0.1086  -0.9939  -0.3147 
  (8.83)**  (7.16)**  (7.74)**  (5.91)**  (4.94)**  (7.15)**  (3.70)**  (-8.82)**  (-1.69)* 
N. of obs.  255  248  255  248  223  226  219  238  234 
R
2  0.44  0.41  0.41  0.38  0.47  0.48  0.37  0.63  0.14 
PART II  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0040  -0.0023  -0.0032  -0.0014  0.0002  -0.0036  -0.0026  0.0230  0.0159 
  (-2.84)**  (-1.39)  (-2.72)**  (1.03)  (0.15)  (-2.01)**  (-1.74)*  (3.49)**  (1.74)* 
DEBTLOW1  -0.0155  -0.0173  -0.0101  -0.0119  -0.0067  -0.0156  0.0009  0.1239  0.0177 
  (-2.91)**  (-2.44)**  (-2.27)**  (-1.95)*  (-0.95)  (-1.64)*  (0.16)  (5.13)**  (0.49) 
N. of obs.  270  263  270  263  225  241  227  253  249 
R
2  0.31  0.32  0.29  0.31  0.41  0.37  0.31  0.48  0.11 
                   
FISCAL  -0.0042  -0.0023  -0.0033  -0.0013  -0.0003  -0.0035  -0.0032  0.0268  0.0249 
  (-3.16)**  (-1.42)  (-2.98)**  (-0.94)  (-0.21)  (-2.07)**  (-2.15)**  (4.53)**  (2.69)** 
DEBTLOW2  -0.0300  -0.0298  -0.0207  -0.0199  -0.0278  -0.0460  -0.0218  0.1842  0.0339 
  (-6.01)**  (-4.86)**  (-4.92)**  (-3.72)**  (-3.84)**  (-6.20)**  (-3.54)**  (8.93)**  (0.94) 
N. of obs.  255  248  255  248  223  226  219  238  234 
R
2  0.39  0.36  0.35  0.34  0.46  0.48  0.36  0.59  0.13 
PART III  INT10Y  INT3M  RINT10Y RINT3M  DISCR  LIBOR  CORP  MSCI  MSCIGR
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
FISCAL*DEBTLOW1  -0.0062  -0.0020  -0.0054  -0.0019  0.0009  -0.0033  -0.0040  0.0282  -0.0124 
  (-2.47)**  (-0.61)  (-2.55)**  (-0.67)  (0.30)  (-1.15)  (-1.26)  (2.64)**  (-0.99) 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH1  -0.0027  -0.0024  -0.0019  -0.0012  -0.0000  -0.0038  -0.0021  0.0199  0.0333 
  (-1.62)  (-1.31)  (-1.40)  (-0.77)  (-0.02)  (-1.66)*  (-1.21)  (2.37)**  (2.75)** 
DEBTLOW1  -0.0049  -0.0188  0.0004  -0.0097  -0.0093  -0.0170  0.0067  0.0990  0.1549 
  (-0.46)  (-1.45)  (0.05)  (-0.88)  (-0.78)  (-1.19)  (0.53)  (2.01)**  (2.62)** 
N. of obs.  270  263  270  263  225  241  227  253  249 
R
2  0.31  0.32  0.30  0.31  0.41  0.37  0.31  0.48  0.14 
                   
FISCAL*DEBTLOW2  -0.0085  -0.0046  -0.0076  -0.0043  -0.0015  -0.0047  -0.0061  0.0342  0.0086 
  (-3.38)**  (-1.43)  (-3.56)**  (-1.50)  (-0.50)  (-1.49)  (-2.24)**  (3.54)**  (0.65) 
FISCAL*DEBTHIGH2  -0.0020  -0.0011  -0.0012  0.0002  0.0001  -0.0028  -0.0019  0.0227  0.0339 
  (-1.34)  (-0.60)  (-0.93)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (-1.45)  (-1.11)  (3.04)**  (2.79)** 
DEBTLOW2  -0.0108  -0.0194  -0.0016  -0.0063  -0.0231  -0.0404  -0.0092  0.1495  0.1098 
  (-1.12)  (-1.61)  (-0.19)  (-0.60)  (-2.03)**  (-3.40)**  (-0.86)  (3.56)**  (1.78)* 
N. of obs.  255  248  255  248  223  226  219  238  234 
R
2  0.40  0.37  0.37  0.34  0.46  0.48  0.37  0.59  0.14 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate; 
FISCAL = 1 two years before a fiscal contraction or expansion, 2 one year before, 3 at the time of the fiscal contraction or expansion, 4 one year after, and 5 two years after; 
 DEBTT+2 = change of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to two years after;  DEBTT+3 = change of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio from the last year of the fiscal contraction or fiscal expansion to three years after; DEBTLOW1 = 1 if, two years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal 
expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 3 percentage points and zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH1 = 1-DEBTLOW1; DEBTLOW2 = 1 
if, three years after the last year of the fiscal contraction (fiscal expansion), the ratio of public debt-to-GDP has declined (increased) more (less) than 5 percentage points and 
zero otherwise; DEBTHIGH2 = 1-DEBTLOW2. See section 2.2 for the definition of fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions. Columns 1 – 9 estimated by OLS and standard 
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 39Figure 2: Interest rates
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 40Figure 3: Stock market prices
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  Episodes of Fiscal Contractions 
           
  T-2  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
           
INT10Y  0.10  0.097  0.094  0.089  0.089 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
INT3M  0.091  0.086  0.087  0.084  0.083 
  (0.07)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
RINT10Y  0.085  0.083  0.082  0.077  0.077 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
RINT3M  0.077  0.073  0.074  0.0073  0.071 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
DISCR  0.084  0.084  0.079  0.080  0.086 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
LIBOR  0.10  0.088  0.087  0.086  0.083 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
CORP  0.097  0.094  0.093  0.093  0.092 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
MSCI  5.46  5.535  5.722  5.79  5.793 
  (0.145)  (0.143)  (0.105)  (0.139)  (0.146) 
MSCIGR  0.047  0.070  0.135  0.088  0.076 
  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
  Episodes of Fiscal Expansions 
           
  T-2  T-1  T  T+1  T+2 
           
INT10Y  0.087  0.093  0.096  0.101  0.106 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
INT3M  0.075  0.087  0.083  0.088  0.094 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
RINT10Y  0.072  0.077  0.081  0.083  0.088 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
RINT3M  0.058  0.069  0.069  0.070  0.076 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
DISCR  0.083  0.086  0.079  0.086  0.083 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
LIBOR  0.085  0.101  0.091  0.098  0.100 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
CORP  0.089  0.097  0.103  0.105  0.107 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
MSCI  5.708  5.683  5.655  5.40  5.345 
  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.137)  (0.197)  (0.199) 
MSCIGR  0.134  -0.025  -0.042  0.037  -0.004 
  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.031) 
Notes: INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year 
government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; DISCR = discount rate; LIBOR =  LIBOR interest rate; CORP = average corporate bonds interest 
rate; MSCI = Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $ and in logs);  MSCIGR =  Morgan Stanley MSCI share price index (expressed in US $) growth rate. 
Standard deviation of the means in parenthesis.   1
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Please find attached the revised version of the paper “Financial Markets’ Behavior around 
Episodes of Large Changes in the Fiscal Stance (Ms. No. EER-D-05-0050)” and a memo in 
which I summarize the changes I made in revising the paper. 
 
I followed closely the suggestions you and the referees provided, for which I am very grateful. I 
hope the new version of the paper well addresses the concerns raised and the paper is now 
suitable for the European Economic Review. 
 
I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to revise my work for the EER. Please do 





Revision Notes  2
Revised  version  of  the  paper  “Financial  Markets’  Behavior  around  Episodes  of  Large 
Changes in the Fiscal Stance” by Silvia Ardagna. 
 
Following the Editor’ and the Referees’ suggestions:  
 
1) I avoided interpreting the results of the paper in light of a particular model. 
 
2) I acknowledged and discussed a potential endogeneity problem relatively to the selection of 
episodes of fiscal adjustments and expansions and to the role of the macroeconomic conditions 
(see pages 5-6). 
 
Following the Editor’s suggestions:  
 
3) I included a subsection (section 3.3) in which I related the results of the paper to relevant 
theory. 
 
4) I corrected the references and the use of “we” and “I”. 
 
5) I pointed out that von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch (2002), von Hagen and Strauch (2001) 
investigate the role of the macroeconomic and monetary conditions for the success of fiscal 
consolidations (see page 6). 
 
Following Referee # 1’s suggestions:  
 
6) I estimated equation (2) by including output gaps instead of the growth rate of real GDP 
among the regressors (see pages 18-19). 
 
7) I estimated equation (2) by including M2 among the regressors to control for the stance of 
monetary policy (see page 19). 
 
Following Referee # 2’s suggestions:  
 
8) I extended the discussion about the use of yearly rather than high frequency data (see pages 4-
5). 
 
9) I corrected the discussion of the descriptive evidence in Figure 2 (see pages 7-8). 
 
10) I eliminated the comment on the second paragraph of page 12 of the original version of the 
paper and the concluding sentence on page 15, section 4.1, of the original version of the paper. 
 
11) I did not delete section 2.3 because I find that a first look at the data is informative. If the 
Referee feels strongly against section 2.3, I am happy to reconsider my choice. 
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